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ABSTRACT – The article reexamines Habermas’s conceptions of 
deliberative politics and procedural democracy in light of other 
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the practical implications of that idea.
KEYWORDS – Deliberative democracy. Liberalism. Proceduralism. Public 
reason.
RESUMO – O artigo reexamina as concepções habermasianas de 
política deliberativa e democracia procedimental à luz de outras teorias 
deliberativas, de forma a explorar as suas semelhanças e diferenças e 
investigar o quanto devem à ideia de razão pública e as implicações 
práticas daquela ideia.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Democracia deliberativa. Liberalismo. Procedi- 
mentalismo. Razão pública.
Among normative theories of democracy, the idea of a deliberative 
democracy is a relatively new kid on the block – though one that has 
already received a fair amount of attention.1 Those who claim the 
label, however, reflect a variety of different political persuasions, and 
deliberative theorists have had a difficult time identifying what makes   
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this conception distinct from its various competitors.2 It is also an idea 
that has recently been the focus of important criticisms, even by those 
generally supportive of its aims.3 In Between Facts and Norms Habermas 
introduces his own conception of a “deliberative politics” and “procedural 
democracy” that has much in common with other deliberative theorists. 
In the following I wish to explore this conception, noting some of its 
similarities and differences from other conceptions. I will then consider 
how it fares against some objections and reservations that have been 
made against deliberative conceptions generally. In the final sections, 
I take up the idea of public reason with which the idea of deliberative 
democracy is closely associated and consider briefly some of the more 
practical implications of that idea.
1.  The idea of a deliberative democracy
The aim of a conception of deliberative democracy is to specify a 
broad set of procedures and conditions for reaching collectively binding 
decisions that are both legitimate and presumptively correct (or rationally 
acceptable). In general, deliberative theorists focus on the (formal and 
informal) processes that precede the final act of decision-making, rather 
than concentrating on a more narrowly conceived process of aggregating 
voter preferences. Legitimacy, for them, derives not simply from the act 
of voting, but from broader processes that lead up to the act of voting 
as well.4 As with other normative conceptions, it is primarily conceived 
as a set of ideal procedures in light of which existing institutions and 
practices could be criticized and assessed.
Joshua Cohen has offered one concise formulation of such an “ideal 
deliberative procedure” that lies at the core of his conception of delibe- 
rative democracy. “A democratic conception can be represented in 
terms of the requirements that it sets on such [an ideal] procedure. In 
particular, outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could 
be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. The ideal 
deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures this principle” (22). 
Johnson and Knight have offered a comparable ideal: “We view deliberation 
as an idealized process consisting of fair procedure within which political   
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actors engage in reasoned argument for the purpose of resolving political 
conflict”.5 Among the “fair procedures” Johnson and Knight include the 
requirement of “manifestly free and equal access to relevant deliberative 
arenas for purposes of establishing procedures, setting the agenda, and 
making final decisions” (285). Their conception differs from Cohen’s 
primarily in its departure from a notion of consensus or agreement as 
a regulative aim of deliberation. (A point to which I will return below.) 
Finally, Samuel Freeman defines a deliberative democracy as “one in 
which political agents or their representatives (a) aim to collectively 
deliberative and vote (b) their sincere and informed judgments regarding 
(c) measures conducive to the common good of citizens”.6 Central to 
all these views is the idea of “a process of public reasoning about the 
common good” (336) and it is this feature that most distinguishes it from 
the liberal-pluralist or “aggregative” alternative.
The conception of a deliberative democracy can also be supported by 
somewhat differing considerations. For Cohen, “the notion of a deliberative 
democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in 
which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds 
through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens”. The 
motivation behind this conception, then, is predominantly a notion of 
public justification among free and equal citizens. Others, such as David 
Estlund, have argued that the “key” to the conception of a deliberative 
democracy is “the idea of true or false judgments about political justice”.7 
Deliberation involves a “pooling of judgments” (Michelman) not a mere 
aggregation of interests. It is thus this cognitive or epistemic feature 
that is central to the conception. Still other deliberative theorists stress 
the unique conception of citizenship and particular virtues or qualities 
of citizenship as a distinguishing feature in a deliberative conception.8 
Although each of these considerations points to important aspects of 
a deliberative conception, in the following I shall argue that what is 
most distinctive about a deliberative conception is the way in which it 
seeks to capture (in a set of ideal procedures) an abstract conception of 
the freedom and equality of citizens. Its primary difference, then, from 
both liberal-pluralist and “radical” (or participatory) alternatives is the   
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way in which this (more) abstract conception is used to shape the ideal 
procedures.
If we begin with what Johnson and Knight call the “standard case” for 
deliberative democracy, several features can be noted. (1) A deliberative 
conception views the democratic process as one that is concerned with 
the common good, where this is not identified exclusively with a notion 
of aggregate interests or collective goods.9 Although politics is not solely 
oriented to it, the idea of the common good is given a more prominent 
normative role than it is within liberal conceptions. (2) In response to the 
longstanding question of whether law is best conceived as voluntas or 
ratio, deliberative conceptions come down on the side of ratio. A central 
means by which the common good is discerned and/or “fashioned” 
(Johnson and Knight) is a deliberative process that places a high premium 
on reason and argumentation. Further, the relevant notion of reason is not 
simply instrumental (or Humean) in character, but includes as well the 
idea that its exercise is “truth-tracking” or at least “reasonable” in a more 
substantive sense. (3) A central assumption of a deliberative conception 
is that the deliberations that take the common good as their focus do not 
simply treat individual preferences as exogenous elements of the political 
system. Rather, it assumes that in the process of reasonable deliberation, 
the search for a common good will often result in the transformation and/
or “laundering” of merely private preferences. “Preferences do not exist 
independently of the institutions through which they are expressed; 
their formation is at least partially endogenous to the process of agenda 
formation, which must, therefore, be seen as a deliberative rather than as 
a purely aggregative mechanism”.10 (4) Finally, deliberative democracy 
invokes a different conception of citizen motivation than that found in the 
liberal-pluralist model. What motivates citizens is not simply self-interest 
constrained by the recognition of some principles for mutual advantage, 
but an interest in finding the common good and a “higher-order” desire 
to justify claims to others who share such an interest.
Not surprisingly, each of these elements has been challenged either by 
recalling earlier criticisms of the “classical conception of democracy” or 
by indicating new difficulties that are uncovered with the aid of theories 
of collective or social choice. (1) At least since Schumpeter, the notion of a 
unique and determinate common good as the object and expression of the 
will of the people has been frequently criticized. “There is no such thing as 
a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be   
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made to agree on by the force of rational argument”.11 Such a conception 
is in conflict with what Schumpeter calls the “irreducible differences of 
ultimate values which compromise could only maim and degrade” (155). 
Moreover, theorists of collective choice have repeatedly demonstrated 
that even if there were a sufficiently determinate conception of the 
common good (or “general will”) it cannot be construed as the outcome 
of any minimally defined set of democratic procedures.12 Deliberativists 
respond that neither a recognition of the “fact of pluralism” (if this is not 
itself already taken to imply value skepticism) nor the theorems of social 
choice theory require rejecting a notion of the common good. While the 
common good may not be a unique and determinate ideal that can be 
specified independently of any (ideal) procedures, deliberativists would 
also reject defining the common good in exclusively proceduralist terms 
(as the social choice theorist’s objection assumes).13 The more plausible 
interpretation is that the common good (or general will) describes a 
general scheme or framework that provides both a focus for deliberation 
and includes at least those (not exclusively procedural) rights and values 
that are conditions for deliberation itself.14 (2) The characterization of 
deliberative democracy as “cognitive” or “epistemic” has also been 
the focus of criticism. The idea that deliberation is concerned with a 
“pooling of judgments” and that one can talk about the truth (or at least 
the reasonableness) of political outcomes in more than an instrumentalist 
fashion strikes many as, at best, misguided and, at worst, pernicious. 
It encourages the view that democracy as a procedure might then be 
replaced by political elites who are better able to discern the correct (true) 
outcomes of democratic deliberation.15 Others (such as Jon Elster) object 
that there may be reason to doubt that more reasoning and deliberation 
will necessarily yield better political outcomes.16 In response to these 
and other objections, deliberativists divide: Some (Estlund) think that 
commitment to a procedurally-independent notion of political truth is 
sine qua non of deliberative politics, but that this commitment can be fit   
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within a democratic process given that it is not the only relevant political 
value.17 Others, by contrast, are more sanguine about the epistemic 
benefits of democracy itself, even if actual democratic procedures are 
at best imperfect procedures (Cohen and Habermas). What nonetheless 
unites these recent conceptions of deliberative democracy is the idea 
that deliberation, as process of reasoning and argumentation, involves an 
exchange of reasons that cannot in the end be reduced to the expression 
of individual preference. (3) and (4): Finally, others have been critical 
of the strong assumptions concerning the transformation of individual 
preferences and/or the civic virtues presupposed in at least some 
deliberative conceptions, suggesting that they are either extremely 
utopian or that they assume too high a degree of homogeneity, or both. 
Deliberativists, in turn, have responded that it is rather the potential 
for preference transformation that is important and that, in many 
cases, the earlier republican or civic humanist stress on virtue can be 
replaced or at least mitigated by more explicit attention to institutional 
design.
1.1  Habermas’s “procedural democracy”
The conception of a “procedural democracy” and “deliberative 
politics” introduced by Habermas in Between Facts and Norms shares, 
in some form, all these features of a deliberative democracy. Politics is 
concerned, at least in part, with the common good and processes of 
deliberation have as their primary focus, at least some of the time, the 
common good or “generalizable interests”. This conception of democracy 
is also “cognitive” in that it is concerned with specifying procedures for 
collective decision-making that have a presumption of rational outcomes 
(BFN, 285). Habermas also argues that democratic procedures should 
specify not simply a means for aggregating pre-political preferences but 
the conditions of deliberation in which agreement about “generalizable 
interests” can be pursued, at least in part through the transformation 
of preferences. Finally, though Habermas puts less emphasis on this 
feature, the realization of a deliberative politics assumes that individuals 
have motivations other than those of self-interest. Democratic procedure 
requires a “rationalized lifeworld” including a liberal political culture and 
corresponding civic virtues that, as he puts it, “meets it halfway”. In 
fact, with respect to each of these features of a deliberative democracy, 
Habermas is inclined to give them a more procedural interptretation. This 
is particularly evident in his attempt to distinguish his position from both 
the liberal and republican alternatives. It will thus be helpful to consider   
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first the sense in which Habermas’s conception of democracy is – and 
is not – procedural.
“Procedural” and “proceduralist” are among the most commonly 
used adjectives in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms. He broadly 
contrasts his preferred “proceduralist legal paradigm” to the liberal 
and welfarist paradigms (BFN, 409). He speaks of a “procedural 
understanding of the constitution” (BFN, 246), a “proceduralist” view of 
constitutional adjudication, a proceduralist understanding of law (BFN, 
409), a proceduralist theory of politics (BFN, 273), and a procedural 
interpretation of popular sovereignty (BFN, Appendix I). He also describes 
his own conception of democracy as “proceduralist”. Within the context 
of German discussions, it is clear that Habermas’s primary concern is 
to distance himself from a material value-ethics interpretations of the 
law and political process, interpretations inspired by the work of Max 
Scheler and Nicolai Hartman (BFN, 254). Habermas also uses the term 
“procedural” to distinguish his own conception of the democratic process 
from liberal and republican alternatives. This is partly to distinguish his 
position from one that takes as fixed and given a “pre-political” set of 
(natural) rights and from one that has the democratic process derive its 
legitimacy “from the prior agreement of a presupposed substantial-ethical 
community” – that is, from a prior agreement on a conception of the good. 
Thus, Habermas writes, “a consistent proceduralist understanding of the 
constitution bets on the intrinsically rational character of the procedural 
conditions grounding the supposition that the democratic process as 
a whole facilitates rational outcomes. In that case reason is embodied 
solely in the formal-pragmatic facilitating conditions for deliberative 
politics” (BFN, 285).
However, within the wider context of legal and democratic theory, the 
term ‘procedural’ is ambiguous and there are many different conceptions 
that have been described as proceduralist that differ importantly from 
Habermas’s own. For example, in his influential essay, “Is Democracy 
Special?”, Brian Barry describes his own conception as proceduralist 
which he understands to mean a rejection of “... the notion that one 
should build into ‘democracy’ any constraints on the content of the 
outcomes produced, such as substantive equality, respect for human 
rights, concern for the general welfare, personal liberty, or the rule of 
law. The only exception (and these are significant) are those required 
by democracy itself as a procedure”.18 While the question of what is 
“required by democracy itself as a procedure” is itself a matter of much 
debate, Habermas’s conception of democracy is not procedural in this   
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sense. It clearly entails more substantive normative content than Barry 
would want.
Further, even normatively richer procedural conceptions, such as 
Peter Singer’s conception of democracy based on a notion of “fairness as 
compromise” or John Ely’s “process-oriented approach” to the constitution 
and constitutional review, fall short of Habermas’s conception.19 For 
these conceptions, the democratic process consists in a set of rules 
and procedures that are supposed to weigh equally preferences whose 
formation is largely exogenous to the democratic process itself. Each 
person should be granted the opportunity to register her preference and 
no person’s preference should count for more than another person’s. The 
conceptions thus operate with an ideal of political equality understood 
in terms of the equal opportunity to influence political outcomes. A 
procedure is “fair” if it captures this notion of equal power. The difficulty 
with such conceptions, however, is that they remain relatively indifferent 
to the initial preferences that enter into the procedure.20 A fuller and thus 
more adequate account would consider the formation and quality of 
preferences as well. To do this, the ideal of political equality must initially 
be conceived at a more abstract level and cannot be identified directly with 
the (procedural notion of the) equal opportunity to influence outcomes.21
Habermas’s conception of democracy thus assumes a more abstract 
ideal of political equality and the aim is then to capture this more abstract 
ideal in a set of ideal procedures thereby considered “fair”. The ideal of 
political equality is, however, not equated with a set of procedures that 
secures an equal opportunity (for any given preference) to influence 
outcome. “Rather, the claim that a norm lies equally in the interest 
of everyone has the sense of rational acceptability: all those possible 
affected should be able to accept the norm on the basis of good reasons” 
(BFN, 103). In this sense, Habermas’s procedural conception is perhaps 
closest to what Charles Beitz has called “complex proceduralism”:
Like other forms of proceduralism, [complex proceduralism] holds that 
democratic procedures should treat persons as equals; but it will not follow 
that the appropriate criterion for assessing procedures is the simple principle 
of equal power over outcomes. Instead, complex proceduralism holds that 
the terms of democratic participation are fair when they are reasonably 
acceptable from each citizen’s point of view, or more precisely, when no 
citizen has good reason to refuse to accept them.22
19  See Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (NY: Oxford University Press, 1974) and 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
20  See Charles Beitz, Political Equality (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 82.
21  See, for example, Habermas’s remark linking the notion of equal respect with the idea 
of reasons acceptable to all (BFN, 103).
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In Habermas’s conception, analogously, there are certain abstract 
ideals – in the last analysis an ideal of (public and private) autonomy or 
communicative freedom – that are identified prior to (and thus independently 
of) any proposed set of (ideal) procedures. Habermas nonetheless describes 
his conception as procedural for two reasons: First, in contrast to a material 
value-ethics, Habermas claims that the fundamental ideal that forms the 
“dogmatic core” of his theory – the idea of communicative freedom or 
autonomy – is not itself simply one value among others, but reflects a basic 
norm implicit in the very idea of communicative action (BFN, 445-446). 
Second, he claims that this ideal – developed in Between Facts and Norms 
in connection with the co-equal and mutually interdependent ideas of 
public and private autonomy – can in turn be expressed in a set of (ideal) 
democratic procedures. It is because the procedures adequately mirror 
this basic ideal, however, that we are entitled to confer a presumption of 
reasonableness or fairness upon them.23 In sum, then, for Habermas, ideal 
procedures attempt to capture or express an ideal or model-conception 
of the citizen as free and equal or, what amounts to the same thing, an 
ideal of practical reason.
1.2  The “co-originality thesis”: Democracy and liberal values
Habermas’s procedural or ‘discourse’ conception of democracy, as 
outlined in chapter four, provides a basis for reconsidering the long-
standing dispute concerning the relation between democracy and other 
liberal values or, in Benjamin Constant’s phrase, the liberty of the ancients 
and the liberty of the moderns. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas 
argues that neither the “principle of democracy” nor the basic scheme 
of (liberal) rights should be seen as primary. Rather, as he puts it, the 
principle of democracy and the basic scheme of rights are “co-original” 
(or “equiprimordal”) and emerge together via the “interpenetration of 
the discourse principle and the legal form” (BFN, 121). As Habermas 
sees it, this enables his conception to avoid the two extremes of a legal 
positivism that leaves basic rights up to the political sovereign, on the 
one hand, and a subordination of popular sovereignty to a prior moral 
principle as in, for example, Kant and the natural law tradition, on the 
other. “The universal right to equal liberties may neither be imposed as 
a moral right that merely sets an external constraint on the sovereign 
legislator, nor be instrumentalized as a functional prerequisite for the 
legislator’s aims” (BFN, 104). Thus, the “co-originality thesis” regards 
public autonomy (roughly, the idea that citizens can be bound only by   
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laws that they give to themselves) and private autonomy (roughly, civil 
and political rights) as reciprocally dependent on each other such that 
neither can claim a prior or independent status.
In an extended comparison between Habermas’s views and his own, 
Joshua Cohen endorses (as also, incidentally, does Rawls) this idea of 
the ‘co-originality’ or ‘equiprimordiality’ of public and private autonomy.24 
However, he is less convinced by the specific arguments in support of it. 
In particular, he suggests, first, that Habermas’s account appeals to a 
“comprehensive doctrine” or philosophy of life that is inappropriate given 
the “fact of reasonable pluralism” and, second, that it is deficient in its 
support for an equal right to liberty. Cohen’s alternative account of the 
relation between basic liberties and democracy is highly instructive and 
strengthens the co-originality thesis. However, given that Habermas has 
elsewhere acknowledged that there is a substantive “dogmatic core” to 
his theory – the idea of communicative freedom or autonomy – I do not think 
it necessary to read him in the more procedurally minimalist manner that 
Cohen proposes. In fact, my account of Habermas’s distinctive use of the 
term ‘procedural’ above is intended to resist such an interpretation.
Cohen’s first reservation is plausible in that Habermas’s account of 
political legitimacy is presented within the wider framework of his theory 
of communicative action. It would thus seem to be a “comprehensive” 
rather than “political” account that appeals to considerations that not 
all politically reasonable citizens would acknowledge.25 However, an 
alternative reading is possible: The “interpenetration of the discourse 
principle and the legal form” can itself be seen as a restriction of the 
more abstract conception of autonomy to the political-legal context and 
thus as first introducing the idea of “legal consociates”.26 In Habermas’s 
own variation on the social-contract tradition, the guiding question then 
becomes, “What basic rights must free and equal citizens mutually accord 
one another if they want to regulate their common life legitimately by 
means of positive law?”.27 Further, this question must be addressed, so to 
speak, from within – that is, without appeal to substantive philosophies of   
 
24  “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”, Ratio Juris, 12 (1999), p. 385-416; for 
Rawls’s views on the “co-originality” thesis, see “Reply to Habermas” in Political 
Liberalism, p. 412.
25  Rawls also objects that Habermas’s theory is ‘comprehensive’ and not ‘political’, 
in “Reply to Habermas”.
26  This interpretation is further supported by the fact that, in BFN, Habermas specifically 
introduces the discourse principle at a quite abstract level, prior to its formulation as a 
moral principle (Principle U) or in connection with the question of political legitimacy 
(BFN, 107-108).
27  BFN, 82; “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights”, Philosophy and Social 
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life (or comprehensive doctrines) that other citizens cannot reasonably be 
expected to endorse. Thus, unlike earlier contract theorists (including at 
least some readings of Rawls), this question cannot be settled by appeal 
to particular interests of the parties nor by appeal to a set of “natural” 
(pre-political) rights, but, in the first instance, to considerations about 
what citizens would consent to in view of their status as free and equal 
persons:
Under conditions of postmetaphysical thinking, we cannot expect a further-
reaching consensus that would include substantive issues. This restriction 
to presuppositions that are formal in this sense is tailored for the specifically 
modern pluralism of worldviews, cultural forms of life, interest positions, 
and so forth. Naturally, this does not mean that a constitution-making 
practice of this kind would be free of all normative content. On the contrary, 
the performative meaning of this practice, which is merely set forth and 
explicated in constitutional principles and the system of rights, already 
contains as a doctrinal core the (Rousseausian-Kantian) idea of the self-
legislation of voluntarily associated citizens who are both free and equal.28
As I will argue below in connection with the idea of public reason, 
this interpretation more or less parallels Rawls’s idea that a “political 
conception” must not be “political in the wrong way”. According to 
Cohen’s second reservation, Habermas’s commitment to equal liberties 
is insufficient since it too rests on his claim that the system of rights 
can be derived exclusively from “the interpenetration of the discourse 
principle and the legal form”. Given that Cohen views the discourse 
principle as imposing a fairly general requirement of impartiality he is 
doubtful that its conjunction with the idea of the “rule of law” (or “legal 
form”) will yield a sufficiently broad set of liberal rights (including, rights 
to conscience, bodily integrity, privacy, property, etc.) (390). Although 
it must be admitted that Habermas’s argument here is less than clear, 
I believe that Cohen is reading Habermas’s account in an excessively 
minimalist or proceduralist manner. If, as I have argued, the discourse 
principle itself reflects an (abstract) ideal of persons as free and equal, 
then it may impose more constraints than Cohen assumes. Further, the 
notion of the “legal form” that Habermas invokes, derived from legal 
debates in 20th century German law, is also more substantive in character 
than the idea of the ‘rule of law’ more narrowly conceived and already 
includes something like the idea of equal subjective liberties.29 Thus, the   
 
28  “Reply”, in Habermas on Law and Democracy, ed. by M. Rosenfeld and A. Arato 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 406.
29  See BFN, p. 84-89 and, more generally on this topic, William Scheuerman, Between 
the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
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“interpenetration” strategy could arguably generate something like the 
liberties specified, for example, in Rawls’s Principle of Equal Liberty. On 
the other hand, however, Cohen is correct to note that, on Habermas’s 
account, the “interpenetration of the discourse principle and legal 
form” yields only a general scheme of basic rights and not a concrete 
set of liberties (393). Although this scheme is more detailed than Cohen 
assumes, it does not by itself provide the means for assigning specific 
weight to the reasons that citizens must consider when determining 
the more specific scope of the basic liberties. On Habermas’s account, 
these are questions that citizens within a given polity must determine 
for themselves within the framework of a deliberative politics. Of course, 
citizens would have to give consideration to precisely the kinds of reasons 
– and the appropriate weighting among them – that Cohen raises in his 
own reflections on the relation between democracy and rights to religious, 
expressive, and moral liberty.30
1.3  The role of consensus
The idea of consensus plays an important role in Habermas’s 
conception of a deliberative democracy as it does in other deliberative 
conceptions. As Cohen has expressed it, “Ideal deliberation aims to 
arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are 
persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and 
reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals”.31 The aim of reaching 
agreement on the basic principles and terms of social cooperation reflects 
the conviction that the democratic process should not simply provide a 
mechanism for aggregating personal or pre-political preferences, but 
should provide a context for reasoned debate and discussion about the 
merits of policies and proposals in a way that recognizes the freedom and 
equality of each citizen. It is also claimed that a search for consensus is 
one way in which what Madison called the “mild voice of reason” can 
find expression within the political process. The idea of consensus, then, 
follows from a commitment to the freedom and equality of citizens and 
from a desire to improve the “reasonable quality” (BFN, 304) of democratic 
outcomes.
Nevertheless, the value placed on a search for agreement or consensus 
has not gone unchallenged by other democratic theorists. Some claim   
 
 
30  See Cohen, “Democracy and Liberty” (in Elster, Deliberative Democracy) and, with 
respect to debates about pornography, “Freedom, Equality and Pornography,” in 
Justice and Injustice in Law and Legal Theory, ed. by A. Sarat and T. Kearns (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996).
31  Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, p. 23.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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that, in a society characterized by the “fact of pluralism”, it is both 
impractical and unreasonable as a goal, while others have pointed to 
the pernicious effects that could follow from an insistence on consensus. 
For example, Donald Moon, who describes his own version of “political 
liberalism” as “a variant of traditional consensus theories of legitimation, 
but one that does not share their faith in supposing that nonconsensuality 
can be overcome” (211), notes the risk in consent theory of “excluding 
certain voices, and so generating a false consensus”. Similarly, in a 
critique of deliberative theories, Iris Young has also argued that the 
demand for consensus can exclude the viewpoints of others and promote 
cultural bias.32 Finally, James Bohman and William Rehg have criticized 
the prominent role given to the search for consensus in Habermas’s 
theory, arguing that a “weaker interpretation of epistemic deliberation” 
is required for a multicultural society.33
Although these criticisms may apply to some models of deliberative 
democracy, in general I think they rest on a misunderstanding of the role 
of consensus. Neither Habermas nor Cohen, for example, claim that all 
social conflict or disagreement can be resolved in a consensus--not even, 
as Johnson and Knight suggest, “in the ideal case at least” (282). Cohen, 
for example, is quite explicit that, “even under ideal conditions there is no 
promise that consensual reason will be forthcoming” (23).34 The bulk of 
the political process, Habermas acknowledges, depends on compromise 
and on the outcome of fair procedures, including, as prominent among 
these, majority rule (BFN, 282). It is thus necessary to be more specific 
about the role (and motivation) of consensus as an aim of deliberation in 
this conception of democracy. Several brief observations are in order.
First, none of the theorists we have been considering suggest 
that political legitimacy requires or rests on a de facto consensus or 
agreement. For just the reasons Moon notes, such a consensus may be 
“false”. Deliberative theorists, by contrast, speak of an ideal consensus 
that can be reached only if certain demanding conditions have been met. 
In this sense, the search for consensus functions primarily as a regulative 
idea that can only be approximately realized in practice. However, once 
the role of consensus is formulated in this way, it suggests that the real 
normative work is not being done by the idea of consensus but by other   
 
32  “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy”, in Intersecting 
Voices (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
33  “Discourse and Democracy,” in Discourse and Democracy, ed. by R. von Schomberg 
and K. Baynes (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), p. 46.
34  For similar remarks, see also Cass Sunstein, “Beyond the Republican Revival,” Yale 
Law Review, 97 (1988), p. 1555 and Frank Michelman,”Law’s Republic,” Yale Law 
Review, 97 (1988), p. 1527.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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ideals lying behind it. As I have suggested, the search for consensus 
reflects a commitment to the view that “the principles of political 
association should be justifiable to all whom they bind” (Larmore). It thus 
rests upon a deeper commitment to the freedom and equality of citizens 
and is not itself an independent goal or value.
Second, recognition of the (derivative) value of consensus as a 
regulative idea does not mean that agreement, even after extended 
deliberation, is to be reasonably expected on a wide-range of preferences 
or policies. There can be, however, no pre-set answer to the question of 
the scope or range of agreement since the search for consensus itself 
may lead to new insight and the discovery (or creation) of new bases for 
agreement. This, at least, is the hope that deliberativists hold out: Unlike 
the liberal-pluralist alternative, it takes the aim of consensus seriously, 
but, unlike the republican (or civic humanist) alternative, it does not 
assume that deep agreement or a “shared common ethos” is likely.
However, there is a further role of consensus in deliberative accounts 
that does seem to require actual agreement in order for (good faith) 
deliberation to take place. If citizens are to regard the outcome of 
deliberative procedures as legitimate and “fair” (even if not necessarily 
right) it would seem that they must all agree that certain values have 
been sufficiently recognized. This follows from the fact that, according 
to the deliberative model, the legitimacy or fairness of the procedures 
is not solely a procedural question.35 As I suggested in connection with 
Habermas’s view above, the conception of equality to which he appeals 
is not the equal consideration of interests procedurally defined, but the 
equal status of citizens as co-authors of the legal order to which they 
are bound – that is, a conception of democratic equality. If citizens are 
not able to agree on a minimal political “core morality” – or if it is not 
embedded in the democratic institutions of the society – then it is not 
clear how the outcomes could claim to be legitimate at all.
Critics may reply (and have replied) that this last role of a political-
moral consensus does not take the fact of moral pluralism seriously 
enough.36 Disagreement is not limited to ethical questions, as Habermas 
has sometimes suggested, but extends to moral questions, or questions 
of justice, as well. Similarly, some critics will find Rawls’s idea of an 
overlapping consensus – a political consensus that can emerge despite a   
 
35  For a persuasive defense of this position, see Joshua Cohen’s critique of Stuart 
Hampshire’s proceduralism, in “Pluralism and Proceduralism”.
36  See, for example, Simon Caney, “Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagreement, 
and Justice”, in Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality, ed. by R. Bellamy and M. Hollis 
(London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 19-36, and Joseph Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity 
and Perfectionism”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29 (2000), p. 5-42.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines – to be similarly suspect. 
Clearly, many questions of justice are as contestable as ethical questions. 
However, as I shall argue in the next section, unless there is reason to 
expect agreement on a minimal core morality it is not clear how any 
further compromise could be regarded as fair, or how any other distinction 
between a reasonable (as opposed to an unreasonable) disagreement 
could be sustained.37
2.  The idea of public reason
The idea of public reason figures importantly in the conceptions of 
political legitimacy proposed by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. 
However each criticizes the other for shortcomings in their respective 
approach: Rawls suggests that Habermas’s idea of public reason is part 
of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine and thus unacceptable as a 
basis of political legitimacy in a society characterized by a plurality of 
comprehensive views. Habermas, by contrast, suggests that Rawls’s 
model of public reason, with its reliance on the idea of an overlapping 
consensus, remains too beholden to the contingencies of a de facto 
agreement to serve as a suitable basis of political legitimacy. Though 
Rawls is not always as clear about his conception of public reason as he 
might be, I wish to argue in the following that the positions of Habermas 
and Rawls are not as far from one another as is often supposed. In 
particular, though Rawls suggests that his model of public reason is 
circumscribed and perhaps even constituted by what he calls the ‘domain 
of the political’, I believe that when his conception of the political is 
properly understood – when, that is, it is not “political in the wrong way” 
– it does not differ significantly from Habermas’s own account of public 
reason. In the end, both accounts of public reason incorporate a core set 
of liberal values tied, in Rawls’s case, to the notion of citizens as free and 
equal persons with the two basic moral powers and, in Habermas’s case, 
to a notion of communicative autonomy.
Public reason for Habermas refers not only to the sense in which in 
acting communicatively (or indeed, as I have argued, in acting for a reason 
at all) a person must suppose that she can justify her action to others.   
 
37  Habermas’s basic strategy in response to this challenge is to “go abstract” and 
argue that in an increasingly pluralist society the bases of agreement shrinks 
to the terms of fair procedure. My claim in the section that follows is that fair 
procedures cannot completely ignore (substantive) issues of equal respect and 
mutual recognition. In fact, the example cited by Bellamy and Hollis – the case 
of the Lincoln/Douglas debate over slavery – shows precisely why not just any 
compromise can be considered fair (see “Consensus, Neutrality and Compromise” 
in Bellamy and Hollis, p. 74-75).K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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The idea of public reason also plays a crucial role in Habermas’s account 
of political legitimacy. Basic political norms (e.g., what Rawls calls the 
“constitutional essentials” and matters of basic justice) are legitimate 
only if they conform to a demanding ideal of public reason, that is, only 
if they could be agreed to by all citizens as participants in a practical 
discourse for the same (publicly available) reasons. Tom McCarthy and 
others have argued that Habermas’s conception of political legitimacy, 
together with this idea of public reason, is too strongly oriented to the 
idea of consensus or “rational agreement” and that he should move more 
in the direction of Rawls’s notion of an overlapping consensus which 
allows for “reasonable disagreement” and “reasonable pluralism” within 
a public culture.38 Political legitimacy neither can nor should depend on 
such a demanding idea of rational agreement but rather should draw upon 
the idea of a “mutual accommodation” among diverse worldviews and 
corresponding forms of life. This revision also entails a more thoroughly 
“proceduralist” interpretation of political legitimacy.
On the other hand, in an extended engagement with Rawls’s work, 
Habermas has argued that Rawls’s notion of an overlapping consensus 
cannot serve the purpose to which Rawls puts it and that Rawls himself 
requires a stronger, more consensualist notion of practical reason to 
support his own liberal principle of legitimacy.39 This principle, it will be 
recalled, reads as follows: “Our exercise of political power is fully proper 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason”40 or, as he has expressed it in more recently: “Our exercise 
of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them 
as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that 
other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons”.41 According 
to Habermas, however, Rawls (at least in Political Liberalism) interprets 
this principle of legitimacy in connection with the de facto emergence 
of an overlapping consensus rather than, as one should, in terms of a   
 
 
38  McCarthy, “Legitimacy and Diversity”; see also James Bohman and William 
Rehg, “Discourse and Democracy: The Formal and Informal Bases of Legitimacy 
in Between Facts and Norms”, in Democracy and Discourse: Essays on Habermas’s 
‘Between Facts and Norms’, ed. R. von Schomberg and K. Baynes (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2002).
39  See The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), chaps 2 and 3.
40  Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137.
41  “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 64 
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more abstract (communication-theoretical) idea of rational agreement 
or acceptability.
In the following I would like not only to defend Habermas’s own 
position, as I understand it, against McCarthy’s “friendly amendment” 
but also argue that Habermas has misunderstood Rawls’s position, which, 
rightly understood, is in fact much closer to Habermas’s own position. 
Even (or precisely) a liberal principle of political legitimacy requires a 
substantive (and not merely “indirect” or procedural) agreement on 
a “core morality” (Larmore) that can be the focus of, or specify the 
content for, a reasonable overlapping consensus.42 However, in contrast 
to Habermas’s reading, this overlapping consensus is not simply a 
“lucky convergence” that just “happens” to come about.43 Rather it can 
only play an appropriate role in justification if it contributes to social 
stability, as Rawls puts it, “for the right reason” and is not “political in 
the wrong way”.44 I thus agree with Larmore when he writes, “[Rawls] 
seems clearly not to believe, contrary to some of his recent critics, that 
the commitments on which his political liberalism rests are simply those 
that people in modern Western societies share as a matter of fact. What 
he holds is that these commitments would be the object of consensus 
to the extent that people view themselves, as they should, as free and 
equal citizens”.45 These considerations suggest that the notion of the 
reasonable (together with his account of public reason) functions for 
Rawls in a different manner than Habermas has suggested. It also 
suggests that the procedural/substantive contrast may be overdrawn 
by several of the participants in this debate.46
42  Joshua Cohen also questions attempts to distinguish sharply between “procedure” 
and “substance” with respect to political values in “Pluralism and Proceduralism”, 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69 (1994), 589-618. For Charles Larmore’s notion of a 
“core morality,” see his The Morals of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), where he argues it includes, among other elements, a “norm of rational 
dialogue” and a “norm of equal respect”. Larmore, it should be noted, does not think 
this “core morality” can be derived from a concept of practical reason alone (see   
p. 56-57); but he also assumes a conception of practical reason that is more restrictive 
than Habermas’s and one that is too sharply contrasted with tradition.
43  Habermas, Inclusion of the Other, p. 84.
44  “Reply to Habermas”, Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1995), 132-180, here p. 142; see 
also Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 188.
45  Larmore, Morals of Modernity, p. 149; for a similar interpretation of Rawls’s later 
writings, with their focus on “stability for the right reasons”, see also Thomas 
E. Hill, “The Problem of Stability in Political Liberalism”, Respect, Pluralism, and 
Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 9.
46  See the important discussion of Joshua Cohen, “Pluralism and Proceduralism” 
Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69 (1994) and Rawls’s own endorsement of this 
interpretation in his “Reply to Habermas”. In effect, neither Rawls nor Habermas 
are ‘proceduralists’ in a very strict reading of this term.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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To begin, then, I will briefly review McCarthy’s criticisms of Habermas. 
According to McCarthy, Habermas has not yet articulated a conception 
of public reason (and, hence, political legitimacy) that can adequately 
respond to the value pluralism that characterizes liberal-democratic 
societies. On the one hand, there typically is no homogeneous ethico-
political culture that could provide the necessary background for an 
agreement on “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice”. 
On the other hand, the model of discourse that Habermas proposes 
does not make sufficient allowance for “reasonable disagreements” 
about moral/ethical questions. Rather, cases supporting the idea of a 
reasonable value pluralism are either interpreted as “interim reports” on 
an on-going moral disagreement, where it is claimed there is only one 
right answer, or they are too quickly treated as a matter of negotiation 
and compromise, in just the way that conflicts of “interest” are to be 
handled.47 The result is a certain inadequacy within Habermas’s theory 
in responding to the value pluralism characteristic of modern societies. 
McCarthy’s suggestion is that, to accommodate the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, Habermas must relinquish the strong claims concerning 
rational agreement (Einverstaendniss), make room for a notion of mutual 
accommodation (152) and, consequently, give his theory a still more 
“procedural twist” (151). By making greater use of his own distinction 
between direct and indirect justification of a norm, for example, Habermas 
could allow for the idea of a “reasonable disagreement” on values, while 
nonetheless still providing citizens with a strong procedural reason for 
accepting as legitimate those norms and decisions they oppose at a 
substantive level (128).
An initial interpretive question that should be raised concerning this 
proposed revision, a question of which McCarthy is aware, concerns the 
nature of the proceduralism he has in mind. What, for instance, is the 
relation between the procedural and substantive elements of the theory 
and how, after this “proceduralist twist”, is Habermas’s position to be 
distinguished from the more common varieties of proceduralism in which 
the “fairness” of the procedure is secured by a much more minimal notion 
of equal consideration of interests than either Habermas or Rawls would 
be comfortable with?48 As I have attempted to show above, despite 
Habermas’s own frequent use of the term procedural, neither Habermas   
 
47  McCarthy, “Legitimacy and Diversity”, p. 150.
48  I have in mind, for example, the views of Brian Barry in “Is Democracy Special?” in 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. P . Laslett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 155-156, 
or Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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(nor Rawls) are proceduralists “all the way down”.49 Rather, both attempt 
to mirror in a set of procedures a prior substantive value or set of values 
– autonomy, in the case of Habermas, and the idea of citizens as free 
and equal persons, in the case of Rawls. It is these values or ideals that 
then confer a presumption of reasonableness or fairness on the proposed 
procedures.50
I would like instead to focus here on another general question 
concerning the use of the term “reasonable” in McCarthy’s reference to 
a “reasonable disagreement” and a “reasonable pluralism”. I assume 
that McCarthy takes over these terms relatively unmodified from Rawls, 
but I want to suggest that Rawls’s own use of them, along with their 
relation to the idea of an overlapping consensus, has not always been well 
understood. A correct interpretation, I believe, puts Rawls and Habermas 
much closer together than either McCarthy or Habermas suppose, since 
both are committed to the view that there must be a prior agreement 
on a “core morality” that each citizen can affirm for the same (publicly 
available) reasons.
The idea of the reasonable is invoked at many levels within Rawls’s 
theory, but its most basic use is with respect to persons: A citizen 
is reasonable if she is willing to accept and abide by fair terms of 
cooperation and willing to accept the “burdens of judgment”, that is, to 
acknowledge and abide by the limits of reason.51 These two basic virtues 
of the citizen are themselves understood in connection with what Rawls 
calls the basic moral powers of the person: the capacity for a sense of 
justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. These moral powers 
(or basic human capacities) are part of a moral psychology or conception 
of the person that, along with the idea of social cooperation, form one 
of the “fundamental intuitive ideas” found in a liberal political culture 
and from which his political conception is drawn. Though this idea is 
according to Rawls not itself part of a comprehensive doctrine or theory 
of human nature, it is nonetheless part of a general set of normative 
reflections, informed as well by moral and social-scientific theory, on 
the basic capacities of human agency.52 Like Korsgaard’s conception 
of practical agency, this “fundamental intuitive idea” of the person is   
 
49  See my “Deliberative Democracy and the Regress Problem: Response to Michelman”, 
The Modern Schoolman, 74 (1997), 333f., and “Democracy and the Rechtsstaat: 
Habermas’s Faktizität und Geltung”, in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, 
ed. S. K. White (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 9; see also 
the important discussion by Cohen, “Pluralism and Proceduralism”.
50  See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 266 and 295; “Reply” in Rosenfeld 
and Arato, p. 406.
51  Political Liberalism, p. 49 note 1.
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(I believe) a conception of the agent that “stands behind” our other, more 
determinate practical identities and is more or less implicitly assumed 
by many different religious and secular traditions. It refers to the general 
human capacity to respond to and act for reasons. The appeal to this 
capacity gives normative content to Rawls’s idea of the reasonable and 
ultimately shapes his notion of a (rational) justification (e.g., what is 
acceptable to “common human reason”).
The further notions of a “reasonable comprehensive doctrine”, 
a “reasonable overlapping consensus,” and “reasonable pluralism” 
all draw upon this prior notion of reasonable persons: a doctrine, for 
example, is reasonable if its more specific elements fall within the 
“burdens of judgment” of reasonable citizens and an overlapping 
consensus is reasonable just in case it is a consensus among reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Finally, a reasonable disagreement is a 
disagreement that persists even after reasonable people, exercising 
good faith and recognizing the “burdens of judgment,” nonetheless fail 
to agree on a particular matter. According to Rawls, in a liberal polity 
such disagreements are to be expected.
It is important to note, however, even in this brief outline, that what 
Rawls describes as the reasonable is not the conclusion or outcome 
of an agreement or overlapping consensus that just happens to exist. 
Rather, the prior idea of the reasonable informs what can count as a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine and thus what could finally be part 
of a (reasonable) overlapping consensus. The idea of the reasonable, in 
other words, is something that must in this sense be given in advance of 
any existing overlapping consensus, rather than something that results 
from it. It might be objected, in response, that this reading does not 
follow Rawls’s own recent distinction between “moral autonomy” and 
“political autonomy” (or, relatedly, between “persons” and “citizens”) 
and thus still gives Rawls’s position a too Kantian interpretation – one his 
“freestanding” political conception is meant to avoid.53 However, though 
Rawls’s own formulations sometimes lend support to such a reading, I 
think this cannot be his considered position. He is himself explicit that 
a “political” conception is still a “moral conception” and, in introducing 
his “criterion of reciprocity” (in which citizens must reasonably think that 
others can reasonably accept the terms of cooperation proposed), he states 
that this criterion bars slavery and other violations of basic liberties.54 
In short, even his conception of the political autonomy of citizens, along   
 
53  See, for example, Rainer Forst, “Die Rechfertigung der Gerechtigkeit” in Das Recht 
der Republik, ed. H. Brunkhorst and P . Niesen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), p. 105-168.
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with the terms of social cooperation they could “reasonably” undertake, 
presupposes the two moral powers or “basic human capacities” Rawls 
earlier introduced in A Theory of Justice.55
A related question often raised in connection with Rawls’s political 
liberalism – and one raised by Habermas – concerns the role that the 
idea of an overlapping consensus plays in its justification (in contrast to 
its stability or likelihood to endure over time).56 According to Rawls, the 
idea of an overlapping consensus is first introduced at a second stage, 
in connection with the question of social stability, not at the first stage 
when the initial justification of the principles of justice is at issue. This 
does not mean, however, that the overlapping consensus is not at all 
relevant to the process of justification. Rawls’s considered view seems 
to be that if it turns out that the political conception justified at the first 
stage is not stable – that is, could not become the object of a reasonable 
overlapping consensus – then this would somehow call into question its 
earlier claim to being justified.57
In his own interpretation of Rawls, however, Habermas seems to 
take a different tack. That is, he attributes a more significant justificatory 
role to the idea of an overlapping consensus than, I believe, Rawls has 
in mind. Habermas apparently does not consider that the idea of the 
reasonable must already be presupposed prior to the identification of 
those comprehensive doctrines that might be eligible candidates for a 
reasonable overlapping consensus, but rather regards the notion of the 
reasonable as itself the outcome of a contingent or “lucky” convergence: 
“Only the lucky convergence of the differently motivated nonpublic 
reasons can generate the public validity or ‘reasonableness’ of the content 
of this ‘overlapping consensus’ that everyone accepts. Agreement in 
conclusions results from premises rooted in different outlooks”.58 Now, 
while it is true that each citizen may and even should look to his or her 
own comprehensive doctrine to see whether he or she has reason to 
affirm the content of the overlapping consensus, it is not the case either 
that the justification of the content rests upon these “nonpublic” reasons 
or that a contingent overlapping consensus produces or defines the 
“reasonableness” of that content.
55  The distinction between ‘moral autonomy’ and ‘political autonomy’ is thus not a 
claim that political autonomy does not presuppose the (Kantian) moral powers 
of the person, but rather a claim that these moral powers do not entail the more 
comprehensive (Kantian) ethic of personal autonomy (see Political Liberalism,   
p. xlv and the helpful discussion in Larmore, “Political Liberalism” [The Morals of 
Modernity (CUP , 1996), p. 134-141].
56  Inclusion of the Other, p. 61, 89f.
57  See “Reply to Habermas”, p. 142f.
58  Inclusion of the Other, p. 84.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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This repositioning of the reasonable within Rawls’s conception of 
political liberalism also then suggests how Rawls may in fact be closer to 
Habermas’s own position. It is the basic idea of the citizen as reasonable 
and rational and, behind this, the idea of the basic moral powers of the 
person that importantly shapes the subsequent employment of the 
reasonable in Rawls’s work. In ways that closely resemble Habermas’s 
basic assumptions about communicative freedom–the capacity to 
take a position on a speech act offer, Rawls’s idea of the reasonable 
acquires at least some of its normative authority from the fundamental 
human capacity to respond to and act from reasons: the legitimacy 
of a political order depends on what citizens can endorse in view of 
their “common human reason” (though a lot of further philosophical 
argument – contained in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism – is 
required to show what kind of political order might possibly satisfy this 
requirement).
Given McCarthy’s reservations about Habermas’s model of public 
reason sketched above, his response to this reading of Rawls might 
simply be, “Well, so much the worse for him!” If the best reading of 
Rawls is one that also commits him to a stronger, more consensualist 
model of political legitimacy, then perhaps he too should be urged to 
move more in the direction of McCarthy’s proceduralism and idea of 
“mutual accommodation”. However, I do not believe this is an option for 
McCarthy because I do not think he is able to make a convincing case 
that his proposed revision constitutes a real alternative to Habermas. It 
only seems to be a real alternative because McCarthy does not clarify 
what he means by a reasonable pluralism and a reasonable disagreement. 
How are these to be distinguished from their unreasonable counterparts? 
I see no alternative to the view that a disagreement is reasonable only 
if there exists at another level an agreement on core values that all can 
accept for the same publicly available reasons – in the last analysis, 
values based on our conception of ourselves as free and equal persons. 
We could think a disagreement arose from the “burdens of judgment” 
rather than willful ignorance or prejudice only if there were a further 
agreement on other basic values. Similarly, we can “(reasonably) agree 
to disagree (reasonably)” (McCarthy) only if we believe other procedures 
that are available for regulating our coexistence at a more abstract level 
reflect norms and values that all could accept for the same (publicly 
available) reasons. In short, it would not be a reasonable pluralism 
or a reasonable disagreement if there were not (or could not) be this 
deeper agreement. McCarthy rightly notes that Habermas’s discussion 
of practical rationality does not adequately address ways to handle 
cases of reasonable disagreement, but I do not think a more adequate or K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
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nuanced account can finally break with Habermas’s criterion of rational 
acceptability.59 As Habermas points out in his reply to McCarthy, even 
McCarthy’s treatment of tolerance and mutual accommodation seem to 
presuppose the ideal of a rationally motivated agreement.60
3.  The practice of public reason
In concluding I will briefly consider some implications this more 
abstract debate regarding the idea of public reason might have for more 
concrete political practice. In particular, I want to suggest some ways 
that it might inform both the practice of toleration and the practice of 
political public reasoning.
(a)  As many commentators have pointed out, toleration is an 
important yet elusive liberal virtue.61 It asks that we live with what 
we might find deeply repugnant from a personal point of view. In this 
respect, it is an attitude that, despite its almost banal ring, is both 
extremely demanding and indispensable to a liberal political culture: 
On the one hand, we may personally (and justifiably) feel quite opposed 
to the practice or way of life we are asked to tolerate, yet, on the other 
hand, we are asked actively to affirm the right of others to engage in 
that practice or way of life (even though we need not have any regret 
should that practice or way of life cease to exist).62 How is it possible to 
cultivate such an attitude, particularly in a pluralist society where we 
are likely to frequently encounter attitudes and ways of life with which 
we disagree? And, secondly, what are the appropriate limits of such an 
attitude: is it necessary to tolerate the intolerable? Is not this paradoxical 
virtue simply one more symptom of an impoverished liberalism that 
finds itself obliged to defend practices it finds morally offensive? These 
are not easy questions to answer but several brief observations can 
be made. Habermas’s distinction between a political culture and the 
larger societal culture, as well as Rawls’ parallel distinction between 
what he calls the “politically public” and the larger background culture, 
is important here inasmuch as the first term in these pairs helps to set 
the basic frame and limits of the tolerable. In this respect it defines the 
minimal “core morality” the violation of which need not be tolerated,   
 
59  For some important suggestions on this topic, see James Bohman, Public Deliberation 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
60  Habermas, “Reply”, p. 402.
61  See David Heyd, ed., Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996).
62  See T. M. Scanlon, “The Difficulty of Tolerance” in Toleration, ed. Heyd, and 
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either from a legal or a moral point of view.63 (I do not mean that, as a 
matter of policy, questions such as the legal regulation of hate speech 
or violent pornography are now immediately settled; but rather that this 
core morality provides the general framework within which a political 
community is first properly bound to address those topics). At the same 
time, however, matters that do not concern the “core morality” of the 
political culture are ones that all citizens have an obligation to tolerate 
as a matter of public morality. It may also be that, as part of an attitude of 
toleration, citizens also have an obligation to try to reach a greater mutual 
understanding of one another’s perspective. The exercise of toleration 
thus may (but need not) develop into stronger forms of appreciation and 
“civic friendship”.
(b)  In the context of his exchange with Rawls, Habermas has 
defended a conception of public reason and corresponding conception of 
“reasonableness” as an important political virtue and one that is probably 
as demanding as the virtue of toleration. In connection with his version 
of “political liberalism” based on the idea of an “overlapping consensus” 
among divergent comprehensive moral or religious worldviews, Rawls 
has argued that, as a duty of civility, citizens have a moral obligation, 
when they consider how to cast their vote, to regard themselves as 
“ideal legislators” and ask whether the reasons in support of the 
proposed legislation or policy are ones that it is reasonable to think 
other citizens could also endorse. In response to criticisms of his initial 
formulation, he now endorses what he calls an “inclusive” model of 
public reason which allows citizens to act from reasons drawn from their 
comprehensive moral or religious convictions so long as they believe the 
positions they support could “in due course” also be supported on the 
basis of public reasons that all affected could acknowledge on the basis 
of their shared conception of themselves as free and equal persons.64 
Rawls goes on to indicate that this “duty” applies only to political 
discussions within the “public political forum” and not to discussion 
within the larger “background culture” of civil society.65 Thus, while 
it is permissible for a person to advocate laws, say, prohibiting same-
sex marriages in various associations and fora of civil society, it would 
be inappropriate for that same person to make such an argument in a 
political forum where it is not reasonable for him or her to assume that 
the co-participants (and co-citizens) could share the same grounds of the 
 
63  I draw this idea of a shared “core morality” from Larmore, Morals of Modernity, p. 12-13.
64  Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, p. 776, 784.
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argument.66 Nonetheless, it is clear that this still represents a quite 
demanding requirement for public reason.
In his own reflections Habermas is led to a similar conception of public 
reason and, if anything, gives it an even stronger interpretation.67 He 
writes: “Anything valid should also be capable of a public justification. 
Valid statements deserve the acceptance of everyone for the same 
reasons”.68 Thus, for Habermas, though it may indeed be possible for 
individuals to embed their shared political ideals within their own 
comprehensive moral or religious worldviews, this connection between 
private moralities and public reason does not provide a sufficiently 
stable or normatively appropriate basis for the legitimate exercise of 
coercive political authority. Rather, citizens must simultaneously both 
presuppose and strive to articulate a basic political consensus (focused 
on the idea of a “core morality” mentioned above) that all citizens can 
endorse as valid for the same (publicly available) reasons. The legitimate 
exercise of political power requires that the reasons that justify at least 
the basic principles of justice and “constitutional essentials” be ones 
that all citizens can endorse for the same reasons – that is, in view 
of their shared conception of themselves as free and equal persons. 
Moreover, the political virtue of reasonableness requires that citizens, in 
regarding themselves as ‘ideal legislators’, seek to find for the policies 
and legislation they support reasons that they reasonably believe others 
could reasonably endorse.
Two important objections to this account of the civic virtues need 
to be addressed: are they themselves exclusionary and/or sectarian in 
conception?, and is it at all plausible to think that they can be effectively 
promoted and sustained within the two-track model of deliberative 
democracy advocated by Habermas?
(1)  The first objection, which has been raised from some quite diverse 
perspectives, is that the virtues of toleration (and reasonableness) are   
 
66  Rawls, it seems to me, is in fact unclear as to whether this constraint applies to 
all citizens or only to legislators and candidates for public office (see p. 767-68 and 
769, where he suggests that all citizens are to think of themselves as if they were 
legislators).
67  Habermas, “‘Reasonable’ versus ‘True’, or the Morality of Worldviews,” Inclusion of 
the Other, chap. 3. Though, as I will argue, this is not the most charitable way to read 
Rawls, it is one that is widely shared; see for example Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: 
The Case for Epistemic Abstinence”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990). 3-46.
68  Habermas, “’Reasonable’ versus ‘True’”, p. 86; see also his “Some Further 
Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality,” Pragmatics of 
Communication, p. 321, where he writes: “Agreement [Einverständniss] in the 
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not innocent but rather function in ways that are both exclusionary and 
sectarian. Although this objection raises a number of extremely complex 
issues, I want to claim in response that, when properly understood, these 
virtues do not have to have the exclusionary consequences its critics 
have claimed. While Kirstie McClure, for example, may be right that the 
practice of toleration asks, say, religious believers to regard the truth 
claims of their faith as matters of private belief, it does not follow that it 
constitutes an unjustifiable or unacceptable harm against them.69 There 
is no guarantee that within a liberal polity matters of religious faith and 
practice or, for that matter, other individual or collective ways of life will 
remain unchanged. The question must be whether or not individuals 
have their equal rights and liberties denied them in their treatment by 
the state. It does not seem to constitute a harm or violation of a right to, 
say, freedom of speech, if one is told that he or she is not morally entitled, 
in certain political fora, to press claims against others that others do not 
(and cannot reasonably be expected to) acknowledge. Similarly, the claim 
that citizens act unreasonably if they promote policies and legislation on 
the basis of non-public reasons does not per se imply that they themselves 
are the victims of exclusionary or sectarian politics. On the one hand, 
to claim that it is a violation of a moral duty to pursue positions on the 
basis of non-public reasons within the more narrowly circumscribed 
political public sphere does not mean that there are not many other 
fora available within civil society in which those views can be aired 
and discussed. Secondly, I have again not broached the difficult topic of 
when (or whether) it is permissible to respond to such moral infractions 
with legal remedies (e.g., the legal regulation of hate speech).70 Rather, 
my more general and limited point has been to claim that the civil duty 
of toleration does not necessarily imply an (unjustifiable) exclusion of 
others or their points of view.
A slightly different version of this objection can be found in the claim 
that the “discipline of public reason” is too harsh in that it will require 
individuals to argue their opinions in a form that will strike them as foreign 
or insincere. If comprehensive doctrines and philosophies of life must be 
left at the entrance to political assembly and arguments presented in   
 
69  Kirstie McClure, Judging Rights: Lockean Politics and the Limits of Consent (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 199.
70  See, however, the cautious defense of a regulation of hate speech by Joshua Cohen, 
“Freedom, Equality and Pornography ” in Justice and Injustice in Law and Legal 
Theory, ed. by A. Sarat and T. Kearns (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
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Speech”, Ethics, 108 (1998), 312-339.K. Baynes – Deliberative democracy and public reason
  Veritas, v. 55, n. 1, jan./abr. 2010, p. 135-163  161
terms of public reasons that others could acknowledge citizens may 
not even recognize themselves in their positions and, ironically, this 
requirement of reciprocity may inhibit the aim of mutual understanding.71 
According to Daniel Weinstock, Rawls’s assumption that public reason 
functions like a “module” that can be attached (or detached) from any 
(reasonable) comprehensive doctrine rests on a questionable psychology 
of beliefs since the “fit” between public and “private” reasons may be 
much tighter for many citizens. As an example   – mine, not Weinstock’s 
– consider Catherine MacKinnon’s description of our gendered society: 
“Men’s physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and health 
insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace 
expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and 
concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions 
define merit, their objectification of life defines art, their military service 
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get 
along with each other – their wars and rulerships – defines history, their 
image defines god, and their genitals define sex”.72 It is difficulty to 
imagine how this criticism of the sexism in social life could be as effective 
if it were to be expressed in the language of public reason – or how it 
could be expressed with the same conviction.
However, I believe this version of the objection misses the point of – and 
motivation for – the idea of public reason, at least in Habermas and Rawls. 
First, as I indicated above (and as Weinstock also notes), the expectation 
that reasoning be public (or that reciprocity be exercised) applies only 
to certain political fora and not within the wider “background” culture 
or in what Habermas calls “civil society”. Such a wide constraint would 
surely undermine, as Weinstock argues, both mutual understanding 
and individual autonomy. More importantly, however, Rawls’s account 
of public reason leaves citizens free to find the deeper roots of their 
convictions about the political values in their comprehensive views and 
thus does not ask them to sacrifice their non-political identity when they 
are asked to argue (again in certain contexts) from their shared pool of 
public reasons. It does assume, however, that they are capable of drawing 
a distinction between their common political identity as citizens and 
whatever further identities they may possess.
(2)  The second objection is equally challenging: Is it in fact reasonable 
to assume that in a civil society characterized as “wild” and “anarchic”   
 
71  See Daniel Weinstock, “Saving Democracy from Deliberation” in: Canadian Political 
Philosophy, ed. by R. Beiner and R. Norman (New York: Oxford University Press), 78-91.
72  Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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the social and cultural conditions will exist that would be required for 
the promotion and maintenance of the civic virtues of toleration and 
reasonableness? Habermas is himself quite aware of this challenge: 
“On account of its anarchic structure, the general public sphere is ... 
more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally 
distributed social power, structural violence, and systematically 
distorted communication than are the institutionalized public spheres 
of parliamentary bodies”.73 There can thus be, it seems, no guarantee 
that the associations arising within civil society will not be “tribalistic”, 
inegalitarian, or ones that contribute to a culture of group bias and 
discrimination. Can a liberal political culture be fashioned and sustained 
under such conditions? It is unlikely that a definitive answer can be given 
to this question one way or the other. Many empirical and normative 
assumptions are involved. However, at least until we have more evidence 
to the contrary perhaps we should not be overly pessimistic about 
the possibilities for wider civility even in the face of a civil society 
that is deeply pluralistic and even “anarchic”. On the one hand, the 
form of civility that is required for a democratic polity may not need 
to be as “thick” as some communitarians and others have supposed. 
What is required, it would seem, is a liberal political culture that 
is based on, and incorporates in its own norms of civility, the “core 
morality” mentioned above. The bonds of civility may not have to 
reach so deeply into particular and often sectarian worldviews that 
it threatens their (at any rate always fluid) identities, and it may be 
possible to embrace the central elements of a core morality from the 
perspective of otherwise very different worldviews. (This, I take it, is 
the important lesson to be learned from Rawls’s idea of an overlapping 
consensus).74
On the other hand, it is perhaps also the case that we have not 
sufficiently explored the ways in which government, through its regulatory 
policy, can help to promote the minimal bonds of civility. This indeed may 
be one of the major differences between the liberal egalitarianism of 
the welfare state and Habermas’s “two-track” model of a deliberative 
politics.75 The largely interventionist and regulatory practices of the liberal 
welfare state, some have argued, may be counterproductive to their own   
 
73  Between Facts and Norms, p. 307-308.
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intended effects.76 What is required – though it is by no means an easy 
task – is a focus on the (limited) ways in which the state, in cooperation 
with institutions of civil society, can help to foster the virtues necessary 
for a liberal political culture.77
76  See, among others, Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996).
77  See on this the interesting proposal concerning the use of the “intangible hand” of 
the state for such a purpose in Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).